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This brief argues that increasing inequality had deep macroeconomic conse-
quences as it contributed, in combination with credit institutions, to either 
stagnating aggregate demand or to increasing public and private debt. 
Inequality may also contribute, along with supply factors, to the drifting 
towards secular stagnation. Income distribution would then be one of the major 
determinants of the increasing global imbalances that made the world economy 
extremely fragile at the outset of the crisis. The crisis in turn exacerbated 
inequality, especially in peripheral Eurozone countries. The path towards 
sustainable future growth passes therefore for a reduction of inequality that, in 
particular in European countries, needs to be coordinated. Finally, if rent-
seeking plays an important role in the past increase of inequality, then active 
fiscal policies and regulation need to be part of the effort to curb inequality.
1. Why the increase in inequality since the 1970s? 
It is widely established that inequality increased substantially, 
both in developed and in emerging economies, starting from the 
late 1970s (IMF, 2007; OECD, 2008; Piketty and Saez, 2013; 
Piketty, 2013; Piketty et al., 2011) In some countries, in particular 
in Europe and in the US, those who lost ground were the middle 
classes, while in others (e.g. China) were the very poor. But in all 
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Francesco Saraceno178cases the redistribution has benefited mainly the rich and the very 
rich (the top one percent of the population, see Figure 1), giving 
birth to what Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) defined the “Super-
star Economy”.
In the past decades, the increase of inequality was mostly 
ignored by mainstream economists. This is explained by the 
revival of the neoclassical tradition, after the crisis of Keynesian 
economics in the 1970s. The neoclassical theory relies on the tradi-
tional textbook dichotomy between efficiency and fairness in the 
allocation of resources, which in turn is rooted in a fundamental 
tenet of the theory: the equality between productive factors’ remu-
neration and their marginal product. Productivity is an “objective” 
criterion for determining the efficient allocation of resources 
among participants to the economy. This has the very strong 
implication that the social desirability of such an allocation, its 
fairness, is not a concern for the economist. Sociologists and polit-
ical scientists may of course prone redistribution on the basis of 
extra-economic concerns, like social stability, fairness, and the 
like. Economists only need to make sure that such redistribution 
does not introduce distortions, i.e. that it does not break the link 
between marginal productivity and factor’s income.
Within this traditional view, two related phenomena would 
help explain the increase of inequality. The first is the skill bias 
introduced by the recent waves of technological progress. The 
impact of the IT revolution was unequal, affecting the productivity 
of high-skilled workers more than that of those with no or little 
education (Katz and Autor, 1999; Rajan, 2010) Diverging wages 
would therefore reflect the widening productivity gap. The second 
phenomenon impacting wage inequality is globalization. Low-
skilled workers entering the global labour market from emerging 
and developing economies lowered the average marginal produc-
tivity of labour, thus lowering its share of national income with 
respect to capital. Furthermore, the increase of competition in 
labour markets reduced the bargaining power of on unions and 
wage setters. Taken together, skill-biased technical progress and 
increased competition in global labour markets could explain 
increasing (wage) inequality as an unavoidable process that policy 
was not supposed to address, if not at the price of reduced effi-
ciency and growth. The idea that the “tide lifts all boats” would 
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very high incomes that accompanied the two prosperous decades 
1990s and 2000s. The traditional view also admits other drivers of 
inequality, for example imperfect financial markets that prevent 
liquidity constrained agents from investing in human capital. 
These, nevertheless, are easily dealt with, once structural reforms 
limit market imperfections.
The financial crisis challenged the traditional view, among 
other things because in spite of the heavy hit taken by the financial 
sector, it disproportionately hit middle and low incomes (OFCE, 
IMK and ECLM, 2014; OECD, 2011). In particular, Galbraith 
(2012) and Stiglitz (2013) argue convincingly that much more 
than the “fundamentals”, like globalization and technological 
progress, what accounts for most of the increase of inequality in 
the past decades is the rise of predatory behavior. Precisely because 
the elites have been appropriating more than a fair share of 
national wealth, increasing inequality has been hampering well-
being and distorting the economy. The rise of rent-seeking and 
predatory behaviour has coincided with the paramount role played 
by an increasingly deregulated financial sector, where the discon-
Figure 1. Average change in income shares for different percentiles, 1980-2007
In %
Note: Unweighted average of the following countries: SP, DK, NZ, FR, SW, NL, UK, IR, SG, SD, IT, JP, US.















Francesco Saraceno180nect between wages and marginal productivity quickly became 
evident. Empirical evidence also seems to run counter the tradi-
tional view. Recent work (see e.g. Ostry et al., 2014) shows that 
there is a robust negative correlation between inequality and 
growth and that, as a corollary, countries with some form of redis-
tributive policies in place tend to grow faster.
Emphasizing rent-seeking (Gaffard and Saraceno, 2014) helps 
explain why the increase of income inequality in the past decades 
benefited the very top incomes (Piketty et al., 2011);² more impor-
tantly, it also highlights the importance of policy choices. The 
economic power of the elites and the conservative revolution in 
politics mutually reinforced each other, leading to increasingly less 
progressive tax systems, and to a downsizing of the welfare state. 
(Creel and Saraceno, 2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010). Rent-
seeking and the excessive weight of finance in GDP seem more 
convincing than the traditional view in explaining the rise of the 
superstar economy. 
2. The crisis, debt, and inequality
At the outset of crisis, in the summer of 2007, the world 
economy was in a situation of structural weakness, caused by the 
progressive accumulation of external imbalances. Some countries, 
most notably the United States and peripheral European countries 
had an excess of demand over domestic production, shown by 
increasingly important trade deficits. This deficit was financed by 
the excess savings that, with different causes, characterized other 
regions like East Asia, oil producing countries, and last but not least 
core European countries. These opposite imbalances compensated 
each other for almost two decades, resulting in an overall balance 
that the crisis showed to be fragile. Excessive debt of the deficit 
countries, be it public or private, suddenly became a burden that 
triggered a race to deleveraging and a generalized drop in spending.
Inequality has a large role to play in explaining the accumula-
tion of debt (Charpe et al., 2009; Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; 
Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010, 2011). The transfer of resources from 
the poor and the middle class to the wealthiest, i.e. from those who 
consume almost all of their income to those who have a high 
propensity to save, caused a reduction in the average propensity to 
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effects, that both played a role in the current crisis. The first is a 
huge mass of liquidity that fuelled a series of speculative bubbles. 
High returns in finance, and its increasing weight in GDP triggered 
a vicious loop by which no real sector investment could compete 
with the yields offered by the financial sector. Resources were 
therefore diverted from productive uses of savings into financial 
assets whose value was artificially inflated. The tendency of 
advanced economies to jump from bubble to bubble can therefore 
be explained, among other things, by the increase of inequality 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011; Galbraith, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013).
The second effect of income redistribution towards the very 
rich, is a chronic tendency to depressed aggregate demand. At the 
IMF Fall 2013 annual meeting Larry Summers conjectured that 
advanced economies in the future will face a low, possibly nega-
tive, equilibrium interest rates, that may lead to a “new normal” 
made of hard choices between unstable, debt-driven growth, and a 
quasi-depressed economy. A number of factors, from aging and 
demographics to slowing technical progress, may support the 
conjecture that globally we may be facing permanently higher 
levels of savings and lower levels of investment, leading to nega-
tive natural rates of interest.
Summers’ conjecture has been widely discussed. Surprisingly, 
the focus was mostly on supply side factors; the long run tendency 
of the propensity to consume to decrease because of inequality was 
not mentioned in the discussion. And yet, redistribution, by 
compressing aggregate demand, may have contributed, along with 
demographics and slowing innovation, to the slow drifting of the 
global economy towards secular stagnation.
 But how did inequality contribute to global imbalances, which 
we claim above are among the structural causes of the crisis?
3. From inequality to structural imbalances
How could the same phenomenon, increased inequality and 
the resulting compression of aggregate demand, lead in some areas 
to excess savings, and in others to excess demand? The answer to 
this apparent paradox lies in the interaction of the trend in income 
distribution, common to all countries, with institutional differ-
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different forms. In the US the reduction in income was offset by 
private borrowing favoured by a less regulated financial system, 
but also by a widespread perception of "end of history” which led 
to believe that all constraints the unlimited growth of some sectors 
(finance, real estate) had been permanently removed (Cynamon 
and Fazzari, 2008). Consequently, aggregate demand (consump-
tion and investment) remained high, even if increasingly financed 
out of debt and not out of income. This did not happen in most of 
Europe, where stricter regulation of financial markets, and less 
accommodating monetary policies, made borrowing for house-
holds and firms more difficult. Fiscal policy was also generally 
more restrictive in European countries, constrained by the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability Pact, while the United States, where 
the welfare system and automatic stabilizers are less developed, 
fiscal policies had to be more active to reduce fluctuations of 
income (Creel and Saraceno, 2010). 
Thus, the downwards pressure on aggregate demand, prompted 
by growing inequality in income distribution, was hidden in the 
U.S. (and to a lesser extent in peripheral European countries) by 
increasing private and public indebtedness (which led to strong but 
ultimately unsustainable growth); in Europe (mainly continental), 
higher costs of borrowing, and greater inertia of macroeconomic 
policy have prevented an adequate level of aggregate demand, and 
the result was a long period of soft growth. The U.S. growth was 
financed by European savings and in turn lifted the old continent 
with its imports, at least partially compensating insufficient 
domestic demand. The excess of savings in other areas (East Asia, 
oil producing countries) also helped to perpetuate this delicate 
balance, which nevertheless was sooner or later doomed to break.
While there is no hard evidence about the interaction of institu-
tions and inequality in explaining different patterns of 
indebtedness and growth, we can look at some stylized facts. 
Figure 2, taken from Fitoussi and Saraceno, (2011), shows that 
countries where short term (consumption) loans increased more in 
the decade leading to the crisis, are the ones in which growth over 
the period 1995-2007 was more robust. This points to a growth rate 
driven by domestic consumption and debt, bound to be fragile.
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If income inequality contributed to building imbalances and to 
an increasingly fragile economy, the ensuing crisis in turn exacer-
bated inequality. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 mainly hit asset 
prices, thus having a major impact on the richest layers of the 
income distribution. This was short-lasted, nevertheless, as the 
prolonged recession, and the jobless recovery that followed, 
quickly restored, and further deepened the distance between the 
rich on one side and the middle and lower classes on the other 
(OECD, 2011). Piketty and Saez’s Top Incomes Database unfortu-
nately does not yet have data for 2012, except for a handful of 
countries. One of them is the United States, where it is clear that 
after the initial drop all top percentiles of the distribution recov-
ered. As a consequence the income share of the top 10% is today 
one percentage point above its pre-crisis peak (Figure 3).
The impact of the crisis on income inequality is particularly 
evident in Europe, where the sovereign debt crisis was met with 
draconian austerity plans and painful supply side reforms. The 
consequence was a double-dip recession from which the Eurozone 
is barely recovering. While top incomes and profits are today at the 
Figure 2. Cumulate change in household short term loans vs change in real GDP, 
1995-2007
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Francesco Saraceno184pre-crisis level, output is well below its peak, and the social fabric is 
seriously deteriorated. Unemployment and poverty hit in 
particular the weakest part of the population (OFCE, IMK and 
ECLM, 2014). 
5. What policies to reverse the trend?
High inequality may be becoming the new normal (Piketty, 
2013). Furthermore, If Summers’ secular stagnation conjecture is 
correct, the pattern that led to the crisis is bound to be repeated in 
the future, as different countries will react differently to declining 
potential growth. A durable rebalancing of the global economy can 
only happen if we manage to escape chronically depressed aggre-
gate demand. This means that as long as domestic imbalances are 
not reabsorbed, both in surplus and in deficit countries, there is 
little hope for achieving structurally solid growth. It is also an illu-
sion to think that a mere realignment of exchange rates (real or 
nominal) would solve the problem, which originates in domestic 
disequilibria. While increasing popular, the option of more or less 
orderly eurexits would hardly allow contrasting the tendency 
towards secular stagnation of which inequality is one of the drivers.
Figure 3. Evolution of top income shares including capital gains – United States
In %                                                                                                                                                  In %
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may turn out to be the easiest lever to pull in order to fight secular 
stagnation. Demographic factors, or innovation trends, are hard to 
govern and to orient. Inequality can instead be tackled by acting 
on multiple levels:
1. Increase the progressiveness of the tax system, in particular 
for high and very high incomes. This should happen in a 
coordinated way to avoid excessive high-skill workers 
mobility.
2. Renew the focus on the provision of public goods, particu-
larly intangible ones such as education and health.
3. Strengthen the insurance role of the government. The trend 
towards reduced importance of automatic stabilization 
should be reversed.
These measures mostly pertain to the national level. Neverthe-
less some form of coordination, at least at the European level, 
would be necessary to avoid tax competition, wage deflation, and 
social dumping, the modern versions of beggar thy neighbor poli-
cies. The reduction of income and consumption inequality would 
stabilize the economic cycle and reduce aggregate savings. This 
would allow for growth rates that may be less remarkable than in 
the past, but certainly more sustainable and equitable.
Three specific proposals, aired in the past few months, should 
become concrete legislative acts in the next European Parliament 
legislature:
1. A European Unemployment subsidy, to be adopted along-
side existing national ones. While not flawless, a good 
starting point, could be the Commission proposal of October 
2nd, 2013 (European Commission, 2013). This would intro-
duce solidarity among Member countries, contribute to fight 
macroeconomic divergence, and help dampen inequality.
2. Introduce a European minimum wage (OFCE, IMK et ECLM, 
2014), to sustain labour income and make tax competition 
harder.
3. Introduce a European corporate tax, also a way to limit tax 
competition, and possibly a way to finance an enhanced 
European budget (see Jacques Le Cacheux or Maitrot de la 
Motte in this issue).
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tax policies is unavoidable. Efforts on capacity building, like on-job 
training and education, are always useful; but, if as Galbraith and 
Stiglitz argue the main cause of inequality is rent-seeking behavior, 
then curbing this through appropriate active fiscal policies 
becomes paramount. This also means that in Europe, prior to the 
implementation of specific economic measures we need a change 
in the political culture that dominated the European construction 
since the Maastricht Treaty.
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